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Abstract
This paper explores welfare implications of exclusivity arrangements, e.g. iPhone￿ s part-
nership with wireless carriers. Two ￿rms compete in a primary good market, while a monop-
olistic ￿rm o⁄ers a value-adding good. The primary good can be consumed alone, while the
value-adding good must be consumed with the primary good. The monopolistic ￿rm forms an
exclusivity partnership with one of the primary good providers. Buyers are able to consume
the value-adding good only if they patronize the monopolistic ￿rm￿ s exclusive partner. This
practice allows the monopolistic ￿rm to extract surplus from the primary good market. Sur-
prisingly, consumers bene￿t from the exclusivity arrangement. However, overall social welfare
declines, despite improvements to consumer welfare.
JEL Nos: L1, L2, L4, L5
Keywords: Exclusivity, Consumer Welfare, Market E¢ ciency, Hotelling
1 Introduction
Dominant ￿rms are increasingly using exclusivity arrangements to exploit their market
power. In particular, substantial public interest has been aroused by Apple￿ s marketing
strategy for iPhone. Apple has granted only a few (selected) wireless carriers the exclusive
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PORE, 117592; Tel: (65) 6516-3775; Fax (65) 6779-5059; Email: bizfq@nus.edu.sg.right to carry iPhone. For instance, in the U.S., Apple locked its iPhone exclusively into
AT&T￿ s network for nearly four years, before it awarded ￿pseudo exclusivity￿to Verizon in
early 2011 and eventually allowed Sprint to include iPhone its lineup later that year.1;2 China
Unicom continues to be the exclusive carrier in China. The suspension of iPhone￿ s exclusiv-
ity practice in the European and Singaporean markets is mainly due to the ￿unfavorable￿
legal environment which Apple had not foreseen.3
In this paper, we provide a stylized analysis of the exclusivity arrangement in a con-
text that, to a large extent, resembles the case of Apple￿ s iPhone. The model includes an
assembly between an ￿upstream￿￿rm (e.g. Apple) that owns a substantially wide niche,
and duopolistic ￿downstream￿￿rms (e.g. wireless carriers). Each of the downstream ￿rms
produces a primary (essential) good, which provides a ￿platform￿for consumers to use a
value-adding (non-essential) complementary good that is o⁄ered by the upstream ￿rm. An
exclusivity partnership between the monopolistic ￿rm and one of the duopolistic ￿rms limits
the availability of the value-adding good on other platforms. As a result, its buyers will be
￿forced￿to patronize the exclusive partner of the monopolistic ￿rm. We provide an equi-
librium analysis of ￿rms￿behavior under such an exclusivity arrangement. It allows us to
evaluate the rami￿cations of exclusivity practice on consumer welfare and market e¢ ciency
in formal ways.
Exclusivity arrangements can be witnessed in many other contexts. For example, Elec-
tronic Arts, a major game developer, has launched games that can only be played on Sony￿ s
PlayStation 3 platform. Many publishers sell electronic versions of their works exclusively
on selected platforms, e.g. Amazon.com￿ s Kindle. Similar arrangements are also observed in
digital media distribution networks, e.g. News Corp￿ s exclusive tablet newspaper The Daily
on iPad.
1The other major wireless carrier, T-Mobile, is still being prevented from including the iPhone into its
device lineups.
2Source: ￿Verizon may pay Apple for iPhone semi-exclusive￿ by Marguerite Reardon, CNET news (
http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-20024767-266.html).
3Source: ￿German Court Ruling Triggers Major Review for iPhone Sales across Europe￿ , Global Insight,
November, 2007.However, none of these arrangements has caused as much controversy as the iPhone ex-
clusivity deals between Apple and its partner wireless carriers. The latter exhibits unique
characteristics that make it fundamentally di⁄er from conventional practice. The primary
good provider (e.g. the Kindle and the iPod), rather than the value-adding good provider
(e.g. e-books and digital music), typically dominates an exclusivity partnership. The bar-
gaining power of upstream ￿rms is often largely limited by the non-essential nature, func-
tional dependence, and/or the ample supply of close substitutes of the value-adding goods
they produce. Their sales typically rely on the extensive consumer base and distribution net-
works of the primary good (i.e., ￿platform￿ ) providers. Thus, these exclusivity arrangements
have little e⁄ect on the structure of downstream (platform) markets.
The opposite is observed in the iPhone case. The iPhone￿ s marketing strategy has been
widely regarded as an attempt to ￿change the existing relationship radically between mobile
handset manufacturers and mobile operators￿ .4 Apple￿ s continuing marketing success and
unique product image, along with its independently integrated product lines, allow its prod-
ucts (e.g., iPhone) to substantially di⁄erentiate themselves from rival devices and to acquire
a unique and wide market niche as a ￿fad￿ . The iPhone has continued to top smartphone
sales chart since its initial launch, and this market dominance has allowed Apple to dom-
inate its partnerships with wireless carriers, giving it the upper hand during negotiations.
The partnership has substantially a⁄ected the balance of power in the downstream wireless
market, and has been viewed by carriers as an e⁄ective means of preempting their rivals.
For instance, the CEO of China Mobile, the leading wireless provider in the massive Chinese
telecom market, acknowledged in public that the ￿rm had been under strong pressure to
include the iPhone in its lineup in order to please its unhappy customers.5
The distinctive exclusivity practice that Apple uses with the iPhone, however, has caused
substantial controversy and aroused strong regulatory concerns. In 2009, four U.S. senators
4Source: ￿German Court Ruling Triggers Major Review for iPhone Sales across Europe￿ , Global Insight,
November, 2007.
5Source: ￿Updated: China Mobile wants iPhone and iPad￿ , iPhonAsia.com, March, 2010.led a petition to persuade the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to investigate
the exclusivity arrangement between the iPhone and AT&T.6 The FCC and Department of
Justice (DOJ) then launched an investigation into exclusionary handset arrangements. In
France, a Paris court rejected the iPhone￿ s exclusivity agreement with France Telecom and
ordered Apple to unlock the mobile device. This ruling was widely regarded as a victory
for French consumers. Despite the high pro￿le debates caused by iPhone￿ s exclusivity, its
implications on market e¢ ciency and consumer welfare have yet to be investigated in formal
analysis. This paper attempts to ￿ll in the gap and contributes to the ongoing policy debate
that surrounds the iPhone￿ s controversial partnerships.
Our paper o⁄ers a stylized but potentially useful analysis of an economic relationship
that resembles the iPhone context. In our model, consumers are uniformly distributed on
a square. Two duopolistic downstream ￿rms, which produce a primary good, are located
at opposite ends of a horizontal line that lies across the middle of the square, while a
monopolistic upstream ￿rm, which produces a value-adding good, is located at the center of
the square. The primary good can be consumed alone, while the value-adding good must be
used together with the primary good in a ￿xed (one-to-one) proportion. In the benchmark
case where exclusivity is absent, the monopolistic ￿rm and the duopolistic ￿rms set their
prices independently. When the monopolistic ￿rm is allowed to practice exclusivity, the game
proceeds as follows. First, the monopolistic ￿rm announces its exclusivity contract, which
speci￿es the price of its value-adding good. Second, it runs an auction to sell its exclusive
partnership, and invites the duopolistic primary good providers to bid for the partnership.
Under the exclusive arrangement, the monopolistic ￿rm ￿locks￿its product to the primary
good o⁄ered by its exclusive partner. Finally, the duopolistic ￿rms simultaneously set their
prices, and consumer purchases take place subsequently.
6They argued that ￿for many consumers, the end result of these exclusionary arrangements is being
channeled to purchase wireless service from a carrier that has monopolistic control over the desired handset
and having to pay a premium price for the handset because the market is void of any competition for the
particular handset.￿ (Source: ￿Department of Justice launches review of handset arrangements￿ by Tom
Braithwaite and Richard Waters, Financial Times, July 7, 2009)We show that the monopolistic ￿rm bene￿ts from exclusivity despite the loss of market
share due to exclusion. This practice allows it to ￿leverage￿its market power in the (non-
essential) value-adding good market so as to extract surplus from the primary good market.
Paradoxically, consumers also bene￿t from the exclusivity practice. The reasons are as
follows.
First, the monopolistic ￿rm engages in a so-called ￿demarginalization￿strategy.7 The
monopolistic ￿rm strategically ￿underprices￿its value-adding good. The lower price boosts
demand for the good and increases the appeal of the primary good o⁄ered by its partner.
This e⁄ect ampli￿es the rent that accrues to its exclusive partner, which allows the monop-
olistic ￿rm to recoup the foregone sales revenue (from its value-adding good) through the
higher revenue from the bidding contest. Consumers who consume the value-adding product
bene￿t from the low price. Second, exclusivity triggers a ￿market stealing￿e⁄ect. The ex-
cluded ￿rm is forced to undercut its rival to avoid losing its market share even further, which
intensi￿es price competition and in turn bene￿ts consumers in the primary good market. In
addition, the monopolistic ￿rm￿ s demarginalization practice strengthens the ￿market steal-
ing￿mechanism: a lower price would further handicap the excluded ￿rm, thereby compelling
it to undercut its rival more.
Our analysis yields interesting policy implications. In contrast to the popular view that
exclusivity arrangements jeopardize consumer welfare, our analysis demonstrates otherwise.
It sheds some light on the recent debates on exclusivity practices in various markets. For
instance, our results cast doubt on the court ruling against iPhone in France on the ground
of consumers￿interests. Our welfare result, nevertheless, should be interpreted with caution.
First, the practice redistributes surplus among di⁄erent consumers: some gain at the expense
of others. Second, social welfare declines despite the gain of consumer welfare. This ￿nding
reveals the complexity in evaluating the rami￿cations of exclusivity arrangement.
7This practice is similar to the two-part tari⁄ used to eliminate the double-marginalization problem in a
vertical distribution channel.Relation to Literature
Our analysis is related to the extensive literature on tying and bundling. The conventional
framework on tying usually involves a multi-product ￿rm that monopolizes at least one
good, and focuses on its incentive to bundle its own products. A tie-in sale has been inter-
preted as a price-discriminating device (see Adams and Yellen, 1976; McAfee, MacMillian
and Whinston, 1984; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999; and Armstrong, 2006), or as a foreclo-
sure or entry-deterrence strategy (Whinston, 1990; Choi and Stefanadis, 2001; Carlton and
Waldman, 2002; and Nalebu⁄, 2004). In a recent paper, Mialon (2011) demonstrates the
anti-competitive e⁄ect of bundling strategy when it motivates merger.
A handful of papers have identi￿ed tying sales as an e⁄ective means of altering price
competition between ￿rms. These studies typically involve one ￿rm monopolizing one good
and competing against others in the market for the other good. Carbajo, De Meza and
Seidman (1990) and Chen (1997) demonstrate that a ￿rm may prefer to sell its multiple
independent goods in bundles, as that creates product di⁄erentiation. In contrast, Carlton,
Gans and Waldman (2010) assume that consumers only value a system that consists of two
goods, with one (primary good) monopolistically supplied, and the other (complementary
good) competitively supplied. They show that a ￿rm that monopolizes the former good
may prefer to tie its latter good. Tying allows the monopolist to alter price competition
in the complementary good market, thereby shifting rent of that market to its own.8 Gans
(forthcoming) extends Carlton, Gans and Waldman (2010) to a more general framework in
which the primary good o⁄ered by the monopolistic ￿rm can be consumed alone. Further-
more, consumers value the complementary good o⁄ered by di⁄erent ￿rms asymmetrically.
Both Carlton, Gans and Waldman (2010) and Gans (forthcoming) demonstrate the social
cost associated with tying and its ambiguous e⁄ects on consumer welfare. More recently,
Miao (2010) studies a monopolistic system maker￿ s (e.g. Microsoft) decision to introduce a
8In contrast to most existing studies, Carlton, Gans and Waldman (2010) allow for reverse tying, such
that consumers can add a second complementary good to the bundle ￿system￿ .separate application or an upgraded system that integrates the application (bundle), when
the application can be supplied by other ￿rms. Miao (2010) focuses on the intertemporal
and compatibility concerns of the monopolist in introducing systems of di⁄erent generations.
Our paper is related to this set of papers, because we also focus on a mechanism that
leverages monopolistic power from one market to alter pricing competition in the other and
to ￿squeeze￿its rent. However, there are a few fundamental di⁄erences. First of all, unlike
these studies, we do not consider multi-product ￿rms. In our context, a monopolistic ￿rm
arti￿cially locks its own (non-essential complementary) product to the primary good of its
exclusive partner. Rent is shifted through a side payment. Second, the monopolistic ￿rm in
our model o⁄ers a non-essential good, whose consumption relies on a competitively-supplied
essential good, while the competitively-supplied essential good can be consumed alone. This
￿ avor has been rare in the literature. Most existing studies assume either (1) that only the
monopolist produces the essential good, or (2) that consumers must consume a system which
includes two goods.9
Our paper is also related to the literature on exclusivity arrangements. However, this
literature has conventionally focused on exclusivity arrangements in vertical distribution
channels (e.g. Hart and Tirole, 1990; O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz,
1994; Fumagalli and Motta, 2006; and Jing and Winter, 2011).10 The current paper di⁄ers
from these studies mainly in two aspects. First, this literature typically studies strategic
wholesale contracting between upstream manufacturer and downstream retailers, with the
former selling its product to one of the latter and relinquishing control over the retail prices.
Our model does not involve ￿wholesale￿ . The contractual arrangement we consider instead
corresponds to the ￿a¢ liation￿mode (Hagiu and Lee, 2011), under which an upstream ￿rm
9One notable exception is provided by Gans and King (2006). They consider the bundling of goods
between di⁄erent ￿rms. In their context, there are two independent and unrelated goods, each produced by
two sellers. They show that two coalitions would endogenously arise in equilibrium, each comprising two
￿rms that produce the two goods. Consumers can purchase a bundle of the two goods at discount from
either coalition.
10There is a small amount of research on exclusivity in the context of two-sided markets. In a recent
working paper, Chowdhury and Martin (2010) investigate the relevant conditions under which a platform
(e.g., newspapers) may bundle a critical product (e.g. columns and comics strips).(e.g. Apple) retains control over the price of its own product and sells the product directly
to consumers, while it can ￿lock￿its product to that of its downstream exclusive partner.
As revealed in our analysis, the ability of the monopolistic ￿rm to price its good triggers
profound strategic interactions. It also crucially a⁄ects downstream market structure and
welfare distribution. Second, following Gans and King (2006), we adopt a ￿square city￿
framework to model demand structure. It re￿ ects consumers￿multi-dimensional preferences
and also distinguishes our paper from the majority of the literature on exclusivity.
The seminal work of Hagiu and Lee (2011) is the ￿rst to distinguish between an ￿upright
sale￿mode (or wholesale) and an ￿a¢ liation￿mode (e.g. selling TV shows through wholesale
to TV channels vs. a¢ liating video games with speci￿c game consoles).11 Their analysis
reveals how multihoming or exclusivity may endogenously arise when ￿content￿is matched
to ￿platforms￿ , under either of the two modes. Our paper, however, focuses rather on the
welfare implications of exclusivity arrangements under ￿exclusive a¢ liation￿ . In addition
to the di⁄erent focuses, our modelling approach di⁄ers subtly from that of Hagiu and Lee
(2011). First, we assume that the monopolistic ￿rm ￿rst commits to an exclusivity plan and
the two duopolistic ￿rms then bid to become the exclusive partner. Hagiu and Lee (2011)
allow competing platforms to o⁄er contracts that specify payments contingent on ultimate
a¢ liation choices (exclusivity or multihoming). Second, Hagiu and Lee (2011) assume that
the platform providers set their prices ￿rst, while we assume that the non-essential value-
adding good provider leads in pricing its goods.12 These di⁄ering modeling nuances ￿t
di⁄erent contexts of interests. In particular, our model intends to re￿ ect the basic premise
that the monopolistic ￿rm dominates in the exclusivity partnership, i.e., with a superior
ability to choose and commit to business modes and contractual terms. The two papers thus
complement each other. We demonstrate later in this paper (1) that the monopolistic ￿rm
bene￿ts from such practice in the current context; and (2) that these modelling ￿ avors are
11The ￿wholesale￿mode requires the content provider to relinquish pricing control while the ￿a¢ liation￿
mode does not.
12In a sense, both papers assume that dominant ￿rms move ￿rst in pricing their goods.consistent with stylized facts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in Section 2 and
analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 demonstrates the welfare implications. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 Setup
Figure 1: The Market of a ￿Square City￿
Following Gans and King (2006), we consider a two-good market as a square city. The
structure of the market is illustrated in Figure 1. A unit mass of consumers is uniformly
distributed within the square. Two competing ￿rms (i = 1;2) provide a primary good X,
while a monopolistic ￿rm sells a value-adding good Y . The primary good X can be consumed
alone. The value-adding good Y , however, must be consumed along with X in a one-to-one
proportion. To provide an analogy, suppose that X represents voice and data services in the
wireless market,13 while Y represents a premium smart handset (e.g., iPhone). Furthermore,
the marginal costs of producing these products are normalized to zero.
As depicted in Figure 1, the two competing ￿rms are located at the end points of the
x￿ axis, 0 and 1. The monopolistic ￿rm is located at the center of the square, i.e., the
13It is reasonable to assume that each consumer possesses a basic phone that allows him/her to enjoy basic
voice and data services.point with the coordinate (1
2;0). Each consumer￿ s preference is characterized by his position
(x;y). If a consumer purchases primary good X from ￿rm 1, he incurs a travel cost of dXx,
while he incurs a travel cost of dX(1 ￿ x) if he purchases the good from ￿rm 2. Similarly, if
a consumer purchases product Y from the monopolistic ￿rm, he bears a travel cost of dY jyj.
It is assumed that each consumer has inelastic demand of up to one unit of each good.
He receives a utility u if he consumes product X, and v if he consumes product Y . It is
assumed that u is su¢ ciently large to sustain full market coverage of X.
In order to focus our attention on the most relevant case, it is further assumed that
(marginal) travel costs are su¢ ciently large, and that the value of Y to consumers is in an
intermediate range. These assumptions are stated as follows.
Assumption 1 v ￿ dX.
Assumption 2 2v < dY < 4v:
The ￿rst assumption rules out the possibility of full foreclosure in equilibrium. That is,
when the monopolistic ￿rm locks Y to the primary good o⁄ered by one ￿rm, the other ￿rm
will not lose its most loyal consumers (i.e. those who are located in the vicinity of the
position of that ￿rm).
The condition 2v < dY implies that the market for Y is never fully covered. Exclusivity
does not pay o⁄ otherwise and welfare analysis would become less interesting when the
monopolistic ￿rm does not implement the strategy in the ￿rst place. However, dY is also
assumed not to be prohibitively high, i.e. dY < 4v.14 Under this condition, the monopolistic
￿rm still retains su¢ cient market coverage, and thus our analysis focuses on the case where
the monopolistic ￿rm serves a nontrivial ￿market niche￿ .
14Or, equivalently, the complementary good is assumed to substantially add to consumers￿utility.3 Analysis
A benchmark case without an exclusivity agreement is ￿rst considered. The equilibrium
when the monopolistic ￿rm is allowed to practice exclusivity is then derived.
3.1 Benchmark: Mandatory Unlocking
We consider a case where the monopolistic ￿rm is prohibited from locking its product to
the primary good o⁄ered by either of the duopolistic ￿rms (e.g., iPhone in France). In
the benchmark case, all ￿rms price and sell their products independently. Consumers who
purchase Y can purchase X from either duopolistic ￿rm.
The competition in the primary good market is analogous to that in a conventional
Hotelling model. The demand for ￿rm 1 is then determined by the equation u￿pX
1 ￿dXx =
u ￿ pX




i ) + dX
2dX
. (1)





2dX . A unique equilibrium exists that
￿rms each charge pX￿
1 = pX￿




In the market for product Y , the type of marginal consumer is determined by setting
v ￿ pY ￿ dYy = 0. The monopolistic ￿rm thus faces a demand of
2(v￿pY )
dY and its pro￿t is
given by ￿(pY) =
2pY (v￿pY )
dY . In equilibrium, it charges v
2, and earns a pro￿t of v2
2dY .
3.2 Exclusivity
We now allow the monopolistic ￿rm to form an exclusivity partnership with one of the
duopolistic ￿rms.15 We consider a three-stage game. The timing of moves is as follows.
1. The monopolistic ￿rm announces its exclusivity plan (pY), and runs an auction to
15For the purpose of this paper, we do not consider the option of ￿outright sale￿by the monopolistic ￿rm
in the model.sell its exclusive partnership. Speci￿cally, the monopolistic ￿rm commits to locking
its product to the primary good o⁄ered by the winning ￿rm. The monopolistic ￿rm
requires its consumers, who have purchased Y at a price pY ￿ 0,16 to purchase X from
its exclusive partner. The term and condition can be alternatively interpreted: only
consumers of the partner ￿rm are eligible to purchase the value-adding good (at a price
pY).
2. Upon observing the exclusivity plan (pY), the two competing ￿rms bid for the partner-
ship. The higher bidder wins and enters the exclusive partnership with the monopolistic
￿rm. A tie would be broken randomly.
3. The duopolistic ￿rms simultaneously announce their prices for X, pX
i (i = 1;2).
4. Consumers observe pY and (pX
i ), and then make their purchases.
A few remarks are in order before we proceed to solve for the equilibrium. First, the
bargaining between the monopolistic ￿rm and the two downstream ￿rms is modelled as a
bidding game. The duopolistic ￿rms submit their bids of ￿subsidies￿ for the exclusivity
partnership. Second, we assume that the monopolistic ￿rm commits to its price pY as
part of the terms that it demands for the exclusivity deal, and that the duopolistic ￿rms
price their products after exclusivity partnership is formed. This modelling nuance closely
mirrors Apple￿ s marketing practice for the iPhone and is consistent with casual observations
from the U.S. wireless market.17 For instance, Apple announced (e.g., in preorder) the
price of the iPhone and its network technology long before the associated wireless plan
was revealed.18;19 Wireless carriers, however, keep on updating the details of their service
16For the sake of analytical convenience and expositional e¢ ciency, it is assumed that the monopolistic
￿rm is unable to price Y below its marginal cost, i.e., pY 2 [0;1). This assumption allows for tractability.
It can also be interpreted as a regulatory restriction.
17Source: ￿Verizon Deal May Expose iPhone Flaws,￿by Joe Nocera, New York Times, January 14, 2011.
18For example, when Verizon announced its iPhone launch in January 2011, it only discussed the price,
which started at $199, for the phone, but ￿wouldn￿ t discuss service plans￿ (Source: ￿Verizon Unwraps
iPhone,￿by Shayndi Raice and Yukari Iwatani Kane, Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2011.
19Source: ￿Verizon Unwraps iPhone,￿by Shayndi Raice and Yukari Iwatani Kane, Wall Street Journal,
January 12, 2011.plans for the iPhone and other wireless devices. This setting re￿ ects the superior bargaining
power of the monopolistic ￿rm. Indeed, the stylized facts are evidence that wireless carriers
have been ￿more willing to give in to Apple￿ s terms￿and to concede to Apple￿ s demands.20
Furthermore, we discuss later (see in Proposition 2) that it is in the monopolistic ￿rm￿ s best
interest to bundle the price of the value-adding good pY into the contract, when practicing
the exclusivity strategy.
3.2.1 Price Competition in the Primary good Market
Without loss of generality, let ￿rm 1 be the winner. Each consumer faces one of three
purchase options: (1) purchasing X from ￿rm 2; (2) purchasing X only from ￿rm 1; or (3)
purchasing the ￿bundle￿of both X (from ￿rm 1) and Y (from the monopolist). Figure 2
illustrates the market segmentation with an exclusivity arrangement.
Figure 2: Market Fragmentation under Exclusivity
Firm 1 secures a larger market share. As Figure 2 shows, some consumers who would
otherwise patronize ￿rm 2 (i.e., those who are located in the right half of the square city),
20Source: ￿Analyst: Verizon Wants Pseudo-Exclusive on iPhone,￿ by John Paczkowski, Digital Daily,
December 6, 2010.may switch to ￿rm 1 if they highly value product Y , i.e., when they are located su¢ ciently
close to the center of the square city in the vertical dimension.21
Let Di denote a ￿rm i￿ s market share. The consumers of ￿rm 1 can be split into two
groups. One group of them purchase X only, which we denote by DX
1 ; while the other
group purchase both X and Y , which we denote by DXY
1 . The following lemma depicts the
equilibrium in the primary good market under an exclusivity plan (pY).
Lemma 1 (i) The partner ￿rm (￿rm 1 by default) charges pX
1 = dX +
(v￿pY )2
3dY for the
primary good and secures a market share of D1 = 1
2 +
(v￿pY )2






















from the primary good market.
(ii) Firm 2 charges a price pX
2 = dX￿
(v￿pY )2



















(iii) Firm 1 secures a greater market share than ￿rm 2, i.e., D1 > D2.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2.2 Equilibrium at the Bidding Stage
As Lemma 1 indicates, exclusivity allows the winning ￿rm to obtain a competitive edge in
the primary good market. For given pY, it earns an extra pro￿t of ￿￿ = ￿1 ￿￿2 =
2(v￿pY )2
3dY .
The bidding subgame boils down to a two-player symmetric complete-information auction.
As a standard result, each ￿rm bids ￿￿ in the unique pure-strategy equilibrium, and one
￿rm (￿rm 1 by default) is chosen as the exclusive partner.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Exclusivity Plan
Now we turn our attention to the equilibrium strategy of the monopolistic ￿rm. It collects
a pro￿t of ￿Y(pY) from selling Y . It also receives revenue through the partner ￿rm￿ s bid
21For the sake of brevity, we do not consider the case in which a foreclosure (i.e., one ￿rm drives the other
out of the market by undercutting price) can arise in the equilibrium. This possibility is precluded by the
two regularity assumptions stated in Section 2.￿￿. Hence, the overall pro￿t of the monopolistic ￿rm is given by ￿m = ￿Y(pY) + ￿￿.
At the beginning of the game, the monopolistic ￿rm chooses pY 2 [0;1) to maximize ￿m,
internalizing its e⁄ect on primary good market competition. Standard technique yields the
solution to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1 (a) In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the monopolistic
￿rm charges pY = 0 for the value-adding good, and receives a pro￿t (from the winning bid)
of ￿m￿ = 2v2
3dY , which is higher than it would receive in the benchmark case (￿￿ = v2
2dY ).
(b) The partner ￿rm (￿rm 1 by default) secures a market share D￿
1 = 1
2+ v2












from the primary good market, while the losing ￿rm (￿rm 2 by
default) secures a market share D￿
2 = 1
2 ￿ v2













As Proposition 1(a) indicates, the monopolistic ￿rm gets better o⁄ when it is allowed
to exercise exclusivity. In equilibrium, the monopolistic ￿rm simply charges the marginal
cost (pY = 0) to consumers, and earns zero pro￿t from retailing the product. The foregone
revenue from selling Y is compensated for through a higher bid from the auction. The logic
will be further elaborated upon in Section 4.1.
We de￿ne this pricing strategy as ￿demarginalization￿ , a practice similar to a two-part
tari⁄scheme to combat the double-marginalization problem in the vertical distribution chan-
nel literature (Sudhir and Datta, 2008). The monopolistic ￿rm charges the value-adding
product at its marginal cost and does not pro￿t from retailing its own product. The low
price, however, allows its exclusive partner to acquire a greater advantage in the downstream
primary-good market. The extra pro￿ts that the exclusive partner receives under the con-
tract eventually ￿nd their way back to the monopolistic ￿rm through a higher bid, which
compensates for the sales revenue that the monopolistic ￿rm has sacri￿ced.
The prediction of the monopolistic ￿rm￿ s underpricing is largely consistent with the
stylized facts in the iPhone case. For instance, the price of an iPhone 4 ranges from $199 to$299, depending on the model speci￿cations. Apple pays approximately $244 on average for
each iPhone to the manufacturers, according to Apple￿ s ￿nancial ￿lings.22;23 Although the
details of iPhone￿ s exclusivity contracts have not been disclosed, it was estimated that AT&T
paid Apple approximately an average of $550 for each iPhone under exclusivity contract.24
3.2.4 Discussion
In setting up the model, we have assumed that the monopolistic ￿rm moves ￿rst in pricing
its product and that it bundles its price in the exclusivity contract. This assumption inar-
guably re￿ ects the monopolistic ￿rm￿ s superior ability to dominate its negotiation with the
downstream duopolistic ￿rms.
We now relax this assumption and allow the monopolistic ￿rm not to commit to pY
during the bargaining process, but to announce it after the bidding. The underlying question
is whether it pays for the monopolistic ￿rm to include pY as a part of the terms in the
exclusivity contract. Next, we consider a case where the three ￿rms are allowed to set their
prices after exclusivity contract is awarded to the winning bidder. Our analysis leads to the
following.
Proposition 2 The monopolistic ￿rm strictly prefers to bundle its price pY into the exclu-
sivity contract.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the monopolistic ￿rm sets the price after settling the amount of transfer in exchange
for the exclusivity partnership, it would then be tempted to charge a higher price for its own
22Source: ￿Does Apple Enjoy a Licensing Loophole on iPhone?￿by Don Clark, Wall Street Journal, No-
vember 20, 2009 (http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/11/20/does-apple-enjoy-a-licensing-loophole-on-iphone).
23When iPhone was initially introduced to the market, it had a price tag of $499. The high price, as a
typical marketing tool to sell ￿hot￿new products, contained a premium that early adopters are willing to
pay. The price of iPhone quickly declined and stabilized. The current price schedules should be considered as
a more appropriate benchmark as they are set to target at mainstream consumers, instead of a small group
of ￿early adopters￿ . The price dynamics of iPhone is consistent with those of many other popular electronics
products as newer models are released and technology advances. Our model, however, is not designed to
capture the dynamic feature of Apple￿ s pricing strategy.
24Source: ￿Is There a Method in Cellphone Madness?￿by Saul Hansell, New York Times, November 15,
2009.good. The higher price leads to a further loss of market share for the monopolistic ￿rm.
Anticipating that, the duopolistic ￿rms would bid less for the partnership, which jeopardizes
the overall pro￿t of the monopolistic ￿rm. We conclude that the monopolistic ￿rm prefers
to commit to its price and include it in the exclusivity contract.
4 Who Bene￿ts from an Exclusivity Arrangement?
The above equilibrium result allows us to explore the welfare implications of exclusivity
arrangements.
4.1 Consumer Welfare
Primarily, we investigate the e⁄ect of exclusivity on consumer welfare. Consumers derive
utility from consuming X and Y . They make payments to these ￿rms in exchange for the
products, and also bear the travel costs. Let W0 and W1 denote consumer welfare in the
benchmark case (without exclusivity) and in the exclusivity arrangement case, respectively.
Our analysis allows us to conclude the following.
Proposition 3 Consumers as a whole bene￿t from exclusivity arrangements, i.e. W1 > W0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The overall consumer surplus increases when exclusivity is in place. In contrast to the
prevailing views, our analysis suggests that banning exclusivity arrangements may para-
doxically hurt consumers. A number of e⁄ects loom large in the presence of exclusivity
arrangements.
On the one hand, exclusivity generates two positive e⁄ects on consumer welfare. First, the
monopolistic ￿rm strategically ￿underprices￿Y . Under exclusivity, customers who patronize
the exclusive partner (￿rm 1) receive not only the primary good but also the privilege of
enjoying the value-adding good Y (at an additional price pY). Hence, a lower pY makes ￿rm1￿ s X more appealing than its rival￿ s, which ampli￿es the rent from the exclusivity arrange-
ment, thereby in￿ ating ￿rms￿bids. By underpricing Y , the monopolistic ￿rm sacri￿ces its
retailing revenue but is ￿subsidized￿by ￿rm 1 through its bid. This practice allows a subset
of consumers (DXY
1 ) to enjoy the value-adding good Y at a lower price. The mechanism is
referred to as a ￿demarginalization￿e⁄ect.
Second, this practice intensi￿es price competition in the primary good market. In equi-
librium, ￿rm 2 charges a lower price than it does in the benchmark case. Handicapped by
￿rm 1￿ s exclusivity partnership, ￿rm 2 undercuts its rival to protect its clientele. Firm 1, as
the exclusive partner, demands a premium price for its X. However, its product also entitles
a consumer the privilege to buy Y at a low price, which could also improve consumer welfare.
In the benchmark case, consumers pay a total of dX+ v
2 if they buy both X and Y ; while they
pay only dX + v2
3dY in the exclusivity arrangement case.25 In summary, exclusivity intensi￿es
price competition in the primary good market, thereby allowing (a subset of) consumers to
pay less for their consumption of Y . This mechanism is referred to as a ￿market-stealing￿
e⁄ect.
Furthermore, the market-stealing e⁄ect has positive interaction with the demarginaliza-
tion e⁄ect. Note by Lemma 1 that pX
2 and pY are strategic complements, i.e.,
@pX
2
@pY > 0. The
market-stealing e⁄ect is magni￿ed when the price of Y is lower. A lower pY exacerbates ￿rm
2￿ s disadvantage, which adds downward pressure to its pricing of X.
On the other hand, this practice distorts market competition and consumer behavior,
thereby resulting in disutility to consumers as well. Exclusivity in￿ icts welfare loss on four
subsets of consumers. First, a subset of ￿rm 1￿ s ￿loyal customers￿(those who are located
su¢ ciently close to zero along the x￿ axis) purchase X only. They end up paying more for
X, because ￿rm 1 charges a premium price. Second, a subset of ￿rm 2￿ s initial customers
in the benchmark case, who highly value Y , would switch to ￿rm 1. The bene￿t these
consumers receive from a lower pY can be o⁄set by the higher travel costs required for
25By Assumption 1, we must have v
2 > v
2
3dY .consuming X. Third, a subset of ￿rm 1￿ s initial customers, who purchase X only, would
switch to ￿rm 2 because of its lower price for X. These consumers bear a higher travel cost
to take advantage of paying less for X. Finally, a subset of ￿rm 2￿ s ￿loyal customers￿are
excluded from consuming Y .
Taken together, the positive e⁄ects unambiguously dominate the negative ones. Con-
sumers, as a whole, bene￿t from the practice.26 This result adds new insight into the
widely-debated exclusivity practice of the iPhone. However, the result must be interpreted
with caution, as exclusivity triggers welfare redistribution among consumers: some gain at
the expense of others.
4.2 Primary good Industry
The e⁄ects of exclusivity on the pro￿tability of the primary good industry are explored now.
The following is obtained.
Proposition 4 In the primary good market, both ￿rms are worse-o⁄ when the monopolistic
￿rm is allowed to practice exclusivity.
Proof. See Appendix.
With a higher product price and an expanded market share, ￿rm 1 receives higher pro￿ts
from its sales in the primary good market in the exclusivity arrangement case. However, the
two duopolistic ￿rms are left in a prisoner￿ s dilemma in the ￿erce bidding war. By practicing
exclusivity, the monopolistic ￿rm is able to leverage its market power to extract surplus from
the primary good market, as the winning ￿rm surrenders its rent in the primary good market
through its bid. Meanwhile, the losing ￿rm responds by aggressively undercutting the price.
The ability of the monopolistic ￿rm to practice exclusivity jeopardizes the pro￿tability of
both ￿rms in the primary good market.
26Additional analysis reveals the intricate redistribution of consumer surplus. More speci￿cally, consumers
(as a whole) realize a gain from the market of Y , but su⁄er a loss in the market of X due to the distortion.
However, the gain dominates the loss, leading to an overall rise in welfare. We do not include the detail in
order to economize on the presentation.Our results are consistent with the stylized facts. It has been reported that AT&T had
su⁄ered a loss from its exclusive iPhone deal with Apple. Despite the fact that the wireless
carrier had successfully lured subscribers away from its competitors, such as Verizon, Sprint,
and T-Mobile, the company ended up with a dip in its pro￿ts. In the second quarter
of 2009, the company￿ s pro￿t fell by $0.27 billion as compared to its pro￿t in the same
quarter a year earlier.27 AT&T￿ s loss was mainly due to ￿the heavy subsidy￿it paid for
the iPhone. Although the details of the exclusivity contract are not publicly available, on
average, AT&T was estimated to have ￿subsidized￿$550 of the price of each iPhone. This
is $200 to $300 higher than the estimated cost of other smartphones.28 Meanwhile, AT&T￿ s
major competitors￿pro￿ts also dipped during the same period.
4.3 Social Welfare
In sum, both the monopolistic ￿rm and consumers (as a whole) bene￿t from exclusivity
arrangements, while the duopolistic ￿rms in the primary good market lose. Despite the gain
in consumer surplus, the overall social surplus declines under exclusivity, which is stated as
follows.
Proposition 5 Social welfare declines as a result of an exclusivity arrangement.
Proof. See Appendix.
The cost of this practice in the primary good market (on the two duopolistic ￿rms) more
than o⁄sets the gains that accrue to consumers and the monopolistic ￿rm. Our analysis thus
indicates the complexity in evaluating the rami￿cations of exclusivity arrangements.
27Source: CNET News: iPhone Buys AT&T Subscriptions￿ But Hurts Pro￿t, by Marguerite Reardon, July
23, 2009.
28Source: ￿IPhone May Cost Verizon $5 Billion in First Year,￿by Amy Thomson, Bloomberg Business-
week, Feburary 16, 2011.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a stylized model to investigate the welfare implications of exclu-
sivity arrangements, quoting iPhone as a motivating example given the wide in￿ uence and
unique characteristics of its marketing practice. We demonstrate that this practice distorts
competition and leads to market ine¢ ciency. Consumers as a whole, however, bene￿t from
it. The practice leads to redistribution among consumers, as some gain at the expense of
others. Meanwhile, the monopolistic ￿rm extracts additional surplus from the primary good
market, which makes the two ￿rms in that industry strictly worse o⁄. Overall, social welfare
declines.
Our analysis has useful regulatory implications. It reveals the complex welfare impli-
cations of an exclusivity arrangement. Banning this practice may hurt consumers instead
of protecting their interests, although doing so would improve social welfare, taking into
account the pro￿ts of the two competing ￿rms in the primary good market.
Our paper o⁄ers one possible perspective for examining the controversial practice of
exclusivity arrangements. There is much room for future extensions. For instance, richer re-
sults might be obtained from a more general model that includes ￿rms￿innovation activities.
Alternatively, the monopolistic ￿rm￿ s opportunistic concerns may also be included in the
model. Another equally reasonable setting is one in which the duopolistic ￿rms collude in
bidding for the exclusivity partnership. In that case, substantially more extensive strategic
interactions can be expected, although modeling the subtle interaction can be technically
di¢ cult. Finally, it is necessary to stress that our model does not intend to capture the
dynamics of the fast-changing iPhone market, where the remaining major wireless carriers
are about to join the competition in the coming months. A substantially richer setup, which
incorporates dynamic elements, is required to provide a complete account of the development
of the market structure. Such an extension is far beyond the scope of the current study, but
will remain the priority of the authors in future research.References
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The mass of consumers who purchase X alone from ￿rm 1 is DX
1 = 2(1










2dX , and the mass of consumers who purchase both X and Y is
DXY











dY . Adding these together, the







A ￿rm i, i = 1;2, earns from the primary good market a pro￿t ￿i = DipX
i . We now





















= 1 ￿ D1: (2)
Firm 1 maximizes ￿1 by choosing an optimal price pX








1 = 0, which yields
pX
1







Hence, we must have in equilibrium pX
1 +pX
2 = 2dX, which is equivalent to pX
2 = 2dX￿pX
1 .








2dXdY , which leads to pX
1 = dX +
(v￿pY )2
3dY , and pX
2 = dX ￿
(v￿pY )2





















We also need to ￿nd out the demand for the add-on product Y , or DXY



















To see whether ￿rm 1 ends up with a higher demand for X under exclusivity, we
simply compare y￿x and 1






2dXdY , and 1









3dXdY . It is straightforward to show that 1





6dXdY : Thus, ￿rm 1 gains demand for X under exclusivity arrangement than in
the benchmark case, at the expense of ￿rm 2. The computation of equilibrium pro￿ts is
straightforward by simple algebra.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In the add-on product Y market, we ￿rst search for the optimal price pY of the

























































2dXdY > 0 is met, d￿m
dpY

































































The assumption v <
dY








Y for all pY 2

































Y . The last inequality obviously
holds i⁄
2(v￿pY )






2dXdY ] < 0.

















Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We now allow the monopolistic ￿rm to set pY after striking the exclusivity deal.
In this case, the monopolistic ￿rm sets pY to maximizes its sale revenue pYDXY
1 , instead
of ￿￿ + pYDXY
1 . It should be noted that for a given pY, DXY
1 is still the same as that in








2dXdY . In this case, the monopolistic
￿rm must set pY > 0. For a given pY, the monopolistic ￿rm still receives a total pro￿t of










2dXdY ]. As we have established
in the proof of Proposition 1, any pY must be strictly suboptimal, because
d￿m(pY )
dpY strictly
decreases with pY when pY 2 [0;v]. We then conclude that the monopolistic ￿rm prefers to
include pY in its contract.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The equilibrium results allow us to compute the values of x;x and y. Hence, ￿x =
x ￿ x = v
2dX. The position of y is given by v








3dXdY , and x = 1
2 ￿ v2
3dXdY . Hence, ￿x = x ￿ x = v




In the benchmark case, consumers pay in total dX to the two ￿rms that provide product
X. The consumption of X entails traveling cost
dX





4dY . Hence, consumers￿welfare can be written as W0 = u ￿ dX ￿
dX
4 + v2
4dY : Under exclusivity, consumer welfare is given by W1 = u￿MX ￿TX +DXY
1 v￿TY.
Let MX denote their payments to Firms 1 and 2, and TX and TY give their travel costs
for X and Y respectively. We now compute each component separately.
First consider the total payment in the base product market, MX. We have MX =(dX ￿ v2





dY ) = dX + v4
9dXd2
Y . Apparently, consumers pay more to
￿rms 1 and 2 under exclusivity arrangement, since MX > dX.




2 ]dX + Tt ￿ T 0
t, where Tt ￿ T 0



















3 [2x2 ￿ 4x2 + 2xx ￿ 3￿x].
Hence,
TX = dX[(x








2 + 2xx ￿ 3￿x)]: (6)














































4 given dY > 4
3v: Thus, compared to the bench-
mark case, consumers incur higher transportation cost in the base product market. Overall,
consumers in the X market are worse o⁄.








1dxdy = xy2dY +
dY ￿xy2
3 :
Finally, we examine the consumer surplus for consuming Y , which is given by WY =
DXY




2dXdY ]v ￿ [xy2dY +
dY ￿xy2





Compared to the benchmark case, consumer surplus from consuming the add-on product






4dY since dY > v
3:
Now we are at the position to compare the overall consumer welfare under both cases.
Now we can rewrite equations for W0 and W1 as W0 = u ￿
5dX
4 + v2












































Y > 0. The last inequality holds if dY > 4
3v, which follows Assumption 1.Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Recall that in the equilibrium, both ￿rms bid ￿￿. The duopolistic ￿rms end up with
the same overall pro￿t although ￿rm 1 earns more from the primary good market. Compare
￿￿
2 with the equilibrium pro￿t of
dX
2 in the benchmark case. The claim is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 5




















dY ￿6v+9dX > 4v2
dY ￿6v+92
3v = 4v2
dY > 0 given Assumption 2: Thus, we have ￿W < 0.